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The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the Berkovitz
case1 furnishes an opportunity for a reminder of the present legal status
of commercial arbitration in this country and an outline of the steps yet
to be taken to modernize the law upon this subject. For over three
hundred years a dictum of Lord Coke has held sway over the legal
minds of America. It is now on its fair way to decent burial. No
movement in recent times has done more to bring the Bar and com-
merce into closer relation than the co-operative work of the past five
years between the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York
and the New York State Bar Association. And now the American
Bar Association, through its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Com-
mercial Law, is taking up the work of nationalizing the movement.
Having been persuaded that American judges had been inadvertently
led into following an obsolete theory of the law, the New York Chamber
of Commerce was of opinion that the presentation of the more modern
doctrine of the English courts would result in the correction of the
judicial error in this country, as it had already been corrected in Eng-
land by the English judges themselves. Accordingly, the Chamber had
prepared to ask leave to intervene in such cases as would present the
subject for reconsideration by the courts and had prepared a review of
the authorities upon the subject.
2
In 1914 the Bar Association of the State of New York created a com-
mittee known as the Committee on the Prevention of Unnecessary Liti-
gation. At the 1916 session of the Association the Committee was
authorized to negotiate with the Chamber of Commerce for the adop-
tion of "Rules for the Prevention of Unnecessary Litigation," among
which, under the heading, "Prevention of Litigation After the Facts
Become Fixed and Before Suit," the Committee included :3
"After the facts upon which a dispute can be based have become
fixed, either before or after a dispute has arisen, it is possible to do.
much t6 prevent litigation. What can best be done in each case, and
whether with or without legal advice, necessarily depends upon the
facts and the parties to the prospective controversy. Differences may
1Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg (1921) 230 N. Y., 261, 13o N. E.
288.
' See Cohen, Commercial Arbitration aid the Law (ii8).
3 40 Proceedings of New York State Bar Association (1917) 387, 389, 390.
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be minimized, adjusted or arbitrated. If not so disposed of litigation
will usually ensue."
"Where differences cannot be adjusted between the parties or their
attorneys and the intervention of a third party becomes necessary, there
are several forms which arbitration may take. The arbitration may be
(I) informal, (q) under the Code, (3) under the auspices of a com-
mercial body, or (4) under the auspices of a bar association.
"The experience of many business men and lawyers testifies to the
advantage of these methods of adjusting differences wherever possible.
They are inexpensive, speedy and peaceful."
At the Conference of Bar Association Delegates held in Cleveland in
1918, resolutions were adopted urging that in the interest of preventing
unnecessary litigation the Bar should encourage the settlement of dis-
putes out of court by arbitration as far as practicable.
The Committee on the Prevention of Unnecessary Litigation became
the Committee on Arbitration of the New York State Bar Association.
In its report of January, I9i9,4 that committee announced that it had
become convinced "that the doctrine of revocability of such agreements
is a legal anachronism which should be eliminated from the law at the
earliest inoment and should induce the courts to reverse their former
rulings as the wisest method of correcting a judicial error of long
standing." In that year the Committee submitted a proposed bill for
the recognition and enforcement of agreements for the arbitration of
controversies.
In 192o three committees of the New York State Bar Association
combined with the Committee on Arbitration of the New York Cham-
ber of Commerce in the drafting of the statute, now the Arbitration
Law of the State of New York. 5 The Committee on Law Reform
said :6
"The demands of international commerce dictate that this nation
should not be behind others, either in honesty or in the facilitation of
contracts containing agreements for arbitration of disputes. The jeal-
ousy of judicial jurisdiction has led to a historical attitude of the Courts
toward arbitration agreements, which is unintelligible at present to the
business man. The subject has been the basis of a remonstrance from
the London Chamber of Commerce to the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York. In this day, it does not seem that any good
public purpose is subserved by treating arbitration clauses as nullities
and unenforceable."
The Committee to Act upon Recommendations of the Conference of
Bar Associations said :7
S42 Ibid. (1919) 93.
'Laws, 192o, ch. 275.
443 Proceedings of New York State Bar Association (1920) 282.
'Ibid. 127, 128.
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"The chairman" believes that the courts should be given opportunity
to correct their error before relief is secured by legislation. His col-
leagues upon this Committee share with him the view that while it is
desirable that judicial error should be judicially corrected, and that
resort to legislation should, as a matter of general policy, not be had in
such matters, and while they do not wish to discourage the efforts of
the Chamber of Commerce, they are nevertheless of opinion that if the
great State of New York is to be the international commercial center it
aspires to be, it must speedily set its house in order and not wait for the
slow and tedious process of judicial correction of judicial error to be
applied in this field. It must promptly simplify its judicial procedure
and must make available to business men the easy methods of commer-
cial arbitration. The anomalous situation now existing in the differ-
ence between the law in all other parts of the civilized world and the law
in our own State should not be permitted to continue. Only in our
own country is an agreement to arbitrate differences treated as some-
thing against public policy, as a contract less sacred and binding than
other commercial agreements. For these reasons your Committee has
conferred with the Committee on Arbitration of the New York State
Bar Association and with the chairman of the Committee on Law
Reform, and members of all three committees have joined in the draft
of the proposed Act ..... .This Act,' in the opinion of your Com-
imttee, will tend to put the State of New York in the lead in the matter
of recognition of arbitration provisions of ordinary commercial con-
tracts and provide a simple method for safeguarding the machinery of
commercial arbitration."
The statute does not merely validate and make enforceable and irrevo-
cable agreements for arbitration. The act recognizes that the infirmi-
ties, common to all contracts, which furnish ground for revocation at
law or in equity, may still exist in cases of arbitration agreements.
Next, if there be any dispute regarding the making of the contract or
submission, or if the existence of a dispute is denied, a trial of that issue
by the court, with a jury, if it is desired by either party, and without,
if it is not, is preserved. The sections of the New York Code of Civil
Procedure relating to the conduct of submissions are retained, so that if
an award is made, based upon an incomplete submission, or affected by
fraud, corruption, partiality, mistake, or any similar misconduct, or if
the arbitrators have exceeded their jurisdiction or made an imperfect
award, the award may be vacated or modified as the circumstances dic-
tate. The award may then be enforced as a judgment, and as such, an
-appeal may be taken from it. And, similarly, from an order vacating
an award the right of appeal is preserved.
In other words, the rights of both parties are reasonably safeguarded,
and no common-law or constitutional right to a jury trial or to the pro-
tection of the courts is taken from them, except so far as by their
express agreement they themselves have provided that the arbitrators,
s The writer of this article.
The present arbitration law, see note 5 supra.
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instead of court and jury or court without jury, shall pass upon certain
questions of fact better suited for decision by them than by strangers to
the customs and practices of the trade.
The statute does not merely correct and modernize the rule. It does
not merely make the law of New York State conform to the public
policy now prevailing throughout the world. It establishes legal
machinery for protecting, safeguarding and supervising commercial
arbitration. Instead of narrowing the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court it broadens it. It adds to its equity powers. It preserves the
right of trial by jury where it should be preserved, and leaves the par-
ties free to waive the jury trial, where they care to waive it.
Presumably men of commercial experience today need no guardian-
ship for determining, at the time of making a contract, whether they
prefer the opinion of their own trade upon technical questions, or the
hazardous judgment of a jury of the vicinage. They know whether
the contract is of a kind under which disputes can better be disposed of
by trade committees or by twelve inexpert strangers to the trade. They
know whether or not they prefer to have judicial selection of arbitra-
tors, and the statute leaves them free either to provide their own method
for selection or to leave it to the court.
Thus two practical results are accomplished. The courts are relieved
of the burdensome technical trade questions which heretofore have been
decided by juries, advised by the very experts, as witnesses, who are
now selected by the parties to dispose of the issue. By one movement
there is removed the expensive and time-consuming process of deter-
mining simple questions of trade customs and trade facts. Questions
of damages involving consideration of market values are likewise dis-
posed of on the basis of trade experiences. On the other hand, the
supervision of arbitrations by the court is preserved. Instead of being
ousted of jurisdiction over arbitrations, the courts are given jurisdic-
tion over them, and where fraud, palpable mistake, or failure to con-
sider the evidence in the case is presented, the party aggrieved has his
ready recourse to the courts. In short, if the parties believe that the
waiving of technical objections to the admission of evidence and of a
jury trial are in their interest, they may so waive them by entering into
an arbitration agreement. And why shouldn't they? Litigation
naturally involves friction, the breaking up of former friendly rela-
tions, either with the bringing of the suit or in the trial. In many
instances it is necessary. But merchants and trade subsist on the con-
tinuity of friendly relations in spite of occasional controversy. Business
men know that in spite of all effort differences will arise-honest dif-
ferences which may either promote friction, heat, engender passion, and
arouse the worst feelings on the part of the persons involved, turning
a small blaze into a conflagration, or may be disposed of as matter of
trade routine with no injury to pride or conscience. No wonder that
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sensible merchants seek a legal method which will enable honest men to
settle their differences without friction and the breach of trade relations.
As was said by Lord Stair, in 1693,
"Nothing is more prejudicial to trade than to be easily involved in
pleas, which diverts merchants from their trade, and frequently mars
their gain and sometimes their credit."'1
Lord Kenyon said, in 1788, in Halfhide v. Fenning:'
"Such references are very advantageous to the parties; as arbitrators
are more competent to the settling of complicated accounts than the
officers of courts of law or equity."
Lord Eldon, in i8o8, in Waters v. Taylor"' referred to litigation of
the parties as "calling down upon them an interposition, perhaps not the
most ruinous, but that cannot take place without infinite mischief to all,
who may have any interest in the subject," and so "I shall give them an
opportunity to pause, and consider, whether they will press for my
determination, or have their disputes determined by"-note the language
here--'-that more wholesome mode, which they have themselves
provided:"
1 3
Lord Campbell, writing the majority opinion in Scott v. Avery, 4
said:
"It seems to me that it would be a most inexpedient encroachment
upon the liberty of the subject if he were not allowed to enter into such
a contract ..... .Public policy, therefore, seems . . . . to require that
effect should be given to the contract."' 5
And now Judge Cardozo, writing the unanimous opinion of the Court
of Appeals, says :'6
1 Mackenzie v. Garvan 3 Sess. Cas. (2d series) 318, 323.
12 Brown's Ch. 336, 337.
22 15 Ves. Jr. I0, 20.
"Lord Chancellor Cranworth in Drew v. Drew (I855, H. L.) 2 Macq. Rep. i,
4, spoke of the rule of unenforceability as "an inconvenient, and, I think I may
be allowed to say, an irrational state of the law, which has since been rectified. . .
11 (1855) 5 H. L. C. 8ii, 851.
"And even Coleridge, who dissented from the decision of that case, admits that
he certainly is "not disposed to extend the operation of a rule which appears to
me to have been founded on very narrow grounds, directly contrary to the spirit
of later times, which leaves parties at full liberty to refer their disputes at pleasure
to public or private tribunals." Ibid. 843.
"'Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg (1921) 230 N. Y. 261, 276, 130
N. E. 288, 292. See also White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek (1921) 296 Ill. 241,
129 N. E. 753, where a statute (Hurd's Ill. Rev. Sts. 1919, ch. io), similar to the
New York Law, was upheld. In another recent case, a Federal District Court
refused to apply the New York Statute and held an arbitration agreement unen-
forceable. The decision, however, appears to rest entirely upon the authority of
previous cases' in higher federal courts. Judge Mack recognizes in his opinion
YALE LAW JOURNAL
"We think there is no departure from constitutional restrictions in
this legislative declaration of the public policy of the state. The ancient
rule, with its exceptions and refinements, was criticized by many judges
as anomalous and unjust. It was followed with frequent protest, in
deference to early precedents. Its hold even upon the common law was
hesitating and feeble. We are now asked to declare it so imbedded in
the very foundations of our jurisprudence and the structure of our
courts that nothing less than an amendment of the Constitution is com-
petent to change it. We will not go so far. The judges might have
changed the rule themselves if they had abandoned some early prece-
dents, as at times they seemed inclined to do. They might have whittled
it down to nothing, as was done indeed in England, by distinctions
between promises that are collateral and those that are conditions. No
one would have suspected that in so doing they were undermining a
jurisdiction which the Constitution had charged them with a duty to
preserve. Not different is the effect of like changes when wrought by
legislation." (Italics ours.)
It is no exaggeration to say that at the present moment commerce and
trade are passing through one of the greatest crises in their history, and,
as the Federal Reserve Bank is acting as a stabilizer for money condi-
tions, existing systems of commercial arbitration are acting as stabil-
izers of commercial relations. That arbitration clauses are now legally
enforceable in New York is a strong inducement toward adjusting
trade difficulties out of court and thus preserving the good relations
between the parties, while securing a fair and reasonable adjustment of
the controversy in hand. This is the public policy behind the statute,
and its efficacy as a preventive of unnecessary and burdensome litiga-
tion is as demonstrable as that sanitation is a preventive of disease.
The source of the common-law doctrine of the revocability of arbi-
tration agreements is to be found in Vynior's Case.'
7
It is clear from a study of the authorities of this period that the rea-
son agreements for arbitration were, in the opinion of the judges,
revocable, was a mistaken idea of the nature of the arbitrator's author-
ity. Chief Justice Coke in Vynior's Case, and the judges and commenta-
tors who followed him, treated the authority of an arbitrator as that of
an agent, which clearly it is not. An agent receives his power from an
individual, and without consideration. From those circumstances
alone is the authority revocable at the principal's will. But when two
parties of opposing interest mutually agree that a third person shall
have power by his decision to bind each of them, the elements of a
bilateral contract exist, and there is a consideration running to each for
the irrevocability of the arbitrator's power. As between the parties he
that the modern tendency is in accord with the New York and Illinois Statutes.
See Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line (Sept. 24, 1921) U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y.,
N. Y. L. Joua. Oct. 20.
11 (16op, K. B.) 4 Coke, 3o2. The law as it stood after that decision is best
stated in March, Actions on Slander and Arbitraments (1648).
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is no longer a simple agent. His authority represents the promise of
each to the other, and is no more to be revoked at will than any other
term of a bilateral agreement.18 But the elements of simple contracts
and rights conferred thereby were not clear to Elizabethan jurists, nor
were the doctrines of agency beyond their earliest infancy. Into this
cloud of misunderstanding and reverence of precedent came the great
authority of Coke, and by an ill-considered dictum was fixed the rule
that an arbitrator's authority was revocable.
But even in Coke's time the judges did not say that the arbitration
agreement was in every sense void. For in Vynior's Case a bond had
been entered into conditioned upon the performance of the arbitration,
and while the defendant was considered to have the power to revoke
the arbitrator's authority, yet by so doing he broke his agreement and
forfeited the bond, hence the plaintiff was allowed to recover thereon.
In other words, a remedy was given upon the contract. It was not in
form an action for breach of the agreement. That was not yet per-
mitted. Plaintiffs must shape their causes to an assumpsit still founded
on an action on the case, or else sue in debt upon the obligation of a
bond. But the result and the intention were the same-to recompense
the obligee for the obligor's default-to give him a remedy for the
breach of the agreement. This remedy may be presumed to have been
adequate, for if the legal adviser of those days were wise, he put the
penalty in such sum as would cover his client in case of the withdrawal
of the other party from the arbitration. But this, of course, was before
fines and penalties were abolished. When they were prohibited,
0 it
then left the aggrieved party with a remedy, it is true, namely, an action
for damages for the breach of the covenant to arbitrate, a remedy
which, as we know, survives to this day, but a remedy which, from a
practical viewpoint, that is the establishment of damages, was inade-
quate. As Fletcher Moulton says in Doleman & Sons v. Ossett
Corporation.2"
"It will be evident, however, that the remedy in damages must be an
ineffective remedy in cases where the arbitration had not been actually
entered into, for it would seem difficult to prove any damages other
than nominal."
As time went on and the notions of simple contract and its effect
became clearer to the English judges, the fallacy in the rule of Vynior's
Case appeared to them. It was at this time that the doctrine of ouster
of the court's jurisdiction was evolved. The origin of that rule lies in
Kill v. Hollister." The case is reported in eleven lines, and the rule
"Collins v. Oliver (1844, Tenn.) 4 Humph. 439, 440.
See Cohen, op. cit. ch. 12.
'0 [1912, C. A.] 3 K. B. 257, 268; see also Cohen, op. cit. 151.
1(1746, K. B.) I Wils. 129.
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is put forth upon no authority whatever and without discussion. But
it was first stated at a period when the struggle between the various
courts for the extension of their jurisdiction was still rife, and the bitter
feeling engendered by the struggle of Coke and Bacon was not yet
settled.
The rule was not immediately accepted as a determining precedent.
In Halfhide v. Fenning,22 Lord Kenyon held good the defendant's plea
that, by the articles of copartnership between the parties, all differences
which might arise were to.be referred to arbitration and that the matter
in dispute had not been so referred.
Alm6st immediately thereafter, in Mitchell v. Harris23 the doctrine
of Kill v. Hollister, supra, was dragged from its resting place in the
old reports and quoted as a determining authority, and upon it a plea,
based upon an agreement to arbitrate, was held bad. And this
remained the English Law until the middle of the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, in Dimsdale v. Robertson24 Lord Chancellor Sugden
said: "I think that Halfhide v. Fenning is still law."
His belief was confirmed and the process of reversing the old rule
was begun in the case of Scott v. Avery. 25 This was not a unanimous
decision, for some of the judges preferred still to remain in line with
precedent, though realizing the weakness of the reasons theretofore
given for the rule. Baron Martin and Lord Coleridge were persuaded
that the old basis for the rule could not be sustained even in their day
and so put the rule upon the new ground of public policy. Their
opinion, however, was overruled by the majority of the lords, and the
law of England immediately after Scott v. Avery was that where a con-
tract provided that no action should be brought between the parties
until arbitrators have disposed of any dispute which might arise
between them, "there is abundant consideration for that in the mutual
contract into which the parties have entered; therefore, unless there is
some illegality in the contract, the courts are bound to give it effect."
This, of course, was not yet a complete reversal of the rule and
amounted only to holding that an agreement that arbitration should be
a condition precedent to any right of action upon the broken contract
was valid. Such was the rule enunciated by the courts of New York
in the case of D. & H. Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co.26 The English courts,
after a long struggle, however, came finally to a complete reversal of
the old doctrine and, contrary to general supposition in this country,
corrected the law, not because of the acts of Parliament, but as a matter
'(1788) 2 Brown's Ch. 336, 337. See supra p. 151.
(1793, Ch.) 2 Ves. Jr. 129.
24 (1844, Ch.) 2 Jones & La Touche, 58.
' (1855) 5 H. L. C. 811.
" (1872) 50 N. Y. 250.
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of judicial development of the common law. . Our oivn courts, not
having had brought to their attention heretofore this recent clarification
of the law by the British courts, are still following English precedents
long since reversed by English courts.
This result in England was not accomplished without a struggle, for,
commencing with the decision of Scott v. Avery, two distinct lines of
cases developed, one limiting it to its narrowest interpretation, the other
broadening it into a rule that all agreements for arbitration were valid.
Aided, no doubt, by the manifestation of public policy shown by the
English Arbitration Act of 1889, the judges who supported the latter
construction were finally victorious.
2"
In Hamlyn & Co. v. The Talisker Distillery,9 the contract provided
for the arbitration of any dispute which should arise out of the contract.
It was held, first, that the validity of this clause should be decided
according to English law, and, second, that under the law of England
such a clause is valid. Lord Watson said :30
"The jurisdiction of the Court is not wholly ousted by such a con-
tract. It deprives the Court of jurisdiction to inquire into and decide
the merits of the case, while it leaves the Court free to entertain the
suit, and to pronounce a decree in conformity with the award of the
arbiter."
Thus in England the long struggle between Coke's dictum and other
precedents on the one hand and reason and experience on the other was
ended. The later decisions of the English courts have only amplified
further the power of the court to recognize and enforce arbitration
agreements, until in Re Arbitration between Wulff and Dreyfus & Co.,"-
the English court went so far as to hold. binding the submission to
counsel of a special case originally prepared for the opinion of the court
and the agreement of the parties to accept the decision of counsel in
place of that of the appellate court.
22
In the Stebbing case,33 the court went so far as to hold that arbitrators
might pass upon the question whether statements made by the assured
upon the basis of which the policy was issued were true. For while
See Cohen, op. cit. ch. 16.
"Ibid.
2'[1894, H. L.] A. C. 2o2.
"Ibid. 211.
(1917, C. A.) 117 L. T. R. 583.
"Among the later cases decided are the following: Smith, Coney & Barrett v.
Becker, Gray & Co. [i916, C. A.] 2 Ch. 86; Gray v. Lord Ashburton [1917,
H. L.] A. C. 26; Clements v. County of Devon Ins. Corn. [1918, C. A.] i K. B.
94; Stebbing v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (1917, K. B.) 33 T. L. R 395; Clough v.
County Live Stock Ins. Ass. (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1185; Lobitas Oil Fields Ltd.
v. Admiralty Com. (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1444; Brodie v. Cardiff Corp. [1919,
H. L.] A. C. 337; Woodall v. Pearl Assur. Co. Ltd. [1919, C. A.] i K. B. 593.
n See note 32 suipra.
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their falsity might avoid the policy, nevertheless, " this is a matter of
difference arising out of the policy."
It must be remembered that an arbitration clause is only part of a
larger contract. While in the legal sense the arbitration provision is
severable, in that, though unenforceable itself, it does not avoid the rest
of the contract, yet the only practical object of such clause is in its
relation to the rest of the contract, providing for sale, construction, pay-
ment, etc. If any of these provisions be broken, a right of action for
damages accrues thereon at once. The purpose of the arbitration clause
is to provide a remedy additional to and other than the action for dam-
ages. In making the contract the parties have in mind that if a breach
or a dispute arises they may go to court to enforce their rights in the
usual manner, but that they do not wish to be limited to that form of
remedy. They are at the time amicably disposed and have a desire not
to press their legal rights against each other to the extent of litigation-
they wish to preserve a general good will between tl~emselves. Their
purpose is to obtain the performance of the contract with due regard to
the rights of each and with good feeling, and they recognize that often
questions of a technical nature arise which only experts in their own line
can properly pass upon. Therefore, they provide that in the event of
dispute it shall be decided by persons of their own choosing, peculiarly
fitted to deal with the facts of the trade, and that each will waive his
rights to the ordinary remedies in a court of law. Obviously then, the
courts are obliged to treat the matter as solely one of remedy.
34
At common law a right of action for damages accrued upon breach of
the arbitration clause even after the abolition of fines and penalties.
This right ig recognized and has often been stated by the courts. Thus
in Haggart v. Morgan'5 the court says:
"The motion for a nonsuit was properly overruled. First, because the
.",They (arbitration agreements) do not affect to touch the obligations of the
parties, as "surely they do not; they prescribe how the parties must proceed to
obtain any redress for their wrongs, which covers only remedies. In one sense
everything which touches the remedy touches the obligation, since the only sanc-
tion to performance rests in the remedy; but that is the speech of philosophers,
not of lawyers, among whom the distinction has arisen and is real." Learned
Hand, J., In Aktieselskabet K. F. K. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten (1916,
S. D. N. Y.) 232 Fed. 403, 405.
So Mr. justice Cardozo holds: "The common-law limitation upon the enforce-
ment of promises to arbitrate is part of the law of remedies. The rule to be
applied is the rule of the forum. Both in this court and elsewhere, the law has
been so declared. Arbitration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be.
settled. It is not a definiti-n of the rights and wrongs out of which differences
grow. This statute did not t.fach a new obligation to sales already mnade. It
vindicated by a new method the obligation then existing." (Italics ours.) Matter
of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg (1921) 230 N. Y. 261, 27o, 13o N. E. 288, 289.
3' (185) 5 N. Y. 422, 427.
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agreement to arbitrate, only entitled the party to damages, but was no
bar to an action." (Italics ours.) 36
Nor is the aggrieved party always limited merely to nominal damages.
Where he has gone to expense in preparing for or executing the arbi-
tration, before his co-party repudiates the agreement, he may recover
such expense, and could, of course, recover any other damages the
amount of which he could prove.1
7
The right upon such a broken contract is, therefore, not a bare unpro-
ductive right, but in a proper case may be invoked to re-imburse the
plaintiff in a substantial amount.
Section 2 of the New York Arbitration Law reads as follows :38
"Validity of arbitration agreements. A provision in a written con-
tract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between
the parties to the contract, or a submission hereafter entered into of an
existing controversy to arbitration pursuant to title eight of chapter
seventeen of the code of civil procedure, shall be valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."
The question in the Berkovitz case3 " was: Is this clause applicable to
contracts made before the passage of the law? Even a casual reading
of this section would seem to demonstrate, with all reasonable certainty,
that the legislature intended that agreements for arbitration contained
in contracts made before the enactment of the statute should be treated
as valid, enforceable and irrevocable. The legislation provides that "a
provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising" shall be valid. But, as to submission, they say that "a
submission hereafter entered into" shall be valid. It is perfectly clear
that the natural signification of the phrase "a written contract" is to
include all written contracts, whether past or future. It cannot in any
sense be held to exclude pre-existing contracts. The sole question is
whether the legislature intended to exclude them. That they did not so
intend is obvious from another word used in the same clause. The sec-
tion relates to a submission hereafter entered into. Submissions of
existing disputes are contrasted with contracts for the arbitration of
future controversies, and, if the enforceable submission are those here-
after entered into, it follows inevitably that all written contracts, whether
heretofore or hereafter made, are included within the scope of the act,
"To the same effect are: Finucane Co. v. Bd. of Education (19o7) igo N. Y.
76, 83, 82 N. E. 737, 739; Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co. (389o) 137 U. S. 370, 385,
11 Sup. Ct. 133, 138; Doleman & Sons v. Ossett Corp. [1912, C. A.) 3 K B. 256,
268.
"This relief was actually given in: Miller v. Canal Co. (I869) 41 N. Y. 98;
Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co. (I899) 157 N. Y. 633, 52 N. E. 671.
Laws, I92O, ch. 275.
"See note i supra.
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else an equivalent expression would have been used as to them. And
so the Court of Appeals held.
. The New York Law obviously was enacted to correct a pre-existing
rule, and a retrospective application made for no disadvantage, created
no injustice and violated no statute of limitations. Rather it made effec-
tive a promise as solemn and as sacred as the promise to pay or the
promise to deliver. The parties were of full age. They weighed the
benefits and the obligatiofls of the contract they were about to make,
and the benefits tipped the scales. After breach, one party claims the
right to repudiate his pact. To support this right he calls upon a rule
founded on a misunderstanding of the principles of law, strengthened by
a jealousy of jurisdiction now discountenanced, continued only by
respect for authority. The experience of centuries of commercial arbi-
tration casts doubt upon his sincerity-it is the defaulting party who
breaks his promise to arbitrate, the party who has most to gain by delay
and technicality. The common knowledge of mankind bears out these
facts. The legislature was cognizant of them.
Dowling, J., in the opinion of the Appellate Division below, 40 based
his decision upon an erroneous understanding of the law. He said,
summarizing the reasons for the court's decision:
"To hold otherwise, would be to attribute to the Legislature an intent
to deprive one party to an agreement of his absolute right to terminate
it at will, to give to the other party an irrevocable right where thereto-
fore it was revocable at the will of the other party, and to create a new
remedy for the enforcement of his new right." (Italics ours.)
So far as the Appellate Division based its construction upon an "abso-
lute right to terminate" the contract at will, it was opposed to the weight
and current of authority in this country.
The cases holding that no man has a vested right to break or avoid a
contract into which he has entered are numerous and apply to a great
variety of subjects. One of the best statements of the rule in this State
is to be found in Brearley School v. Ward.4' This case involved the
construction of Section 1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to allow execution to issue in some cases where thitherto it had
been prohibited. In Laird v. Carton,42 the court construed this amend-
ment to be retrospective in its application, upon the ground that it
affected a remedy only. In the Brearley case, the defendant contested
the constitutionality of such a retrospective application so far as it
allowed execution to be levied upon part of the income from a trust
fund created by a will probated prior to the enactment of the amend-
ment. The court held that there was no merit in his defence
43
(i92o) 193 App. Div. 423, 427. 4 (1911) 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. Iooi.
(1909) 196 N. Y. i6q, 89 N. E. 822. '
See language of court in Brearley case, supra, 2oi N. Y. 358, 363, 364, 367,
368, 371.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
As the court said in Shields v. Clifton Hill Land Co. :'4
"'A party has no vested right in a rule of law which would give him
an inequitable advantage over another, and such rule may therefore be
repealed, and the advantage thereby taken away. To illustrate this
remark, if by law a conveyance should be declared invalid if it wanted.
the formality of a seal; or a note, if usurious interest was promised by
it; or if in any other case, on grounds of public policy, a party should
be permitted to avoid his contract entered into intelligently and without
fraud, there would be no sound reason for permitting him to claim the
protection of the Constitution, if afterwards, on a different view of
public policy, the Legislature should change the rule, and give effect to
his conveyance, note, or other contract, exactly according to the original
intention. Such infirmities in contracts and conveyance are often cured
in this manner, and with entire justice; and the same may also be done
with defects in legal proceedings, occasioned by mere irregularities.'"
(Italics ours.)
Judge Cardozo, who wrote the opinion in Jacobus v. Colgate,45 dearly
perceived the distinction between that case and the point involved in the
Berkovita case. He said: 46
"Our decision in Jacobus v. Colgate, much relied upon by counsel, has
little pertinency here. We dealt there with a statute which gave a remedy
for a wrong where there had been no remedy before. Right and remedy
coalesced, and took their origin together. Finding them so united, we
construed the statute which defined them as directed to the future.
Here the wrong to be redressed is the rejection of merchandise in viola-
tion of a contract. Such a wrong had a remedy for centuries before the
statute. All that the statute has done is to make two remedies available
when formerly there was one.
We think the promise to arbitrate must be held within the statute, and
the subject-matter of the controversy within the purview of the promise."
The claim that the statute was unconstitutional in depriving the party
of his right of trial by jury was disposed of by the Court of Appeals in
these words :47
The courtcites Curtis v. Leavitt (857) 15 N. Y. 9 and Ewell v. Daggs (1883)
io8 U. S. 143, 2 Sup. Ct 4o8. An earlier case upon the point in the United States
Supreme Court, one of the leading cases in this country, is Satterlee v. Matthewson
(1829, U. S.) 2 Pet. 380. See also Gross v. United States Mortgage Co. (1883)
io8 U. S. 477, 488, 2 Sup. Ct. 940. 946. One of the earliest and best-considered
cases in the State of New York is Van Rensellaer v. Snyder (0855) 13 N. Y.
299, 3o3. See also Syracuse City Bank v. Davis (1853, N. Y.) i6 Barb. i88;
Washburn v. Franklin (1861, N. Y.) 35 Barb. 599; Johnson v. Bentley (847)
i6 Ohio, 97, ioo.
" (,894) 94 Tenn. 123, 149, quoting from 2 Story, The Constitution (5th ed.
189) 703.
' (i916) 217 N. Y. 235, i1 N. E. 837.
'Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlbert, supra note I, at p. 272, 13o N. E.
at p. 290.
' Ibid. 273, 13o N. E. at p. 291.
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. The statute is assailed as inconsistent with article I, section 2, of the
Constitution of the state, which secures the rightof trial by jury. The
right is one that may be waived. It was waived by the consent to arbi-
trate. We are told that the consent must be disregarded as illusory
because the parties could not be held to it till the statute was adopted.
A consent, none the less, it was, however deficient may once have been
the remedy to enforce it. Those who gave it, did so in view of the possi-
bility that a better remedy might come. They took the chances of the
future. They must abide by its vicissitudes.
At the same time that the New York Court of Appeals decided the
Berkovitz case, it decided Spiritusfabriek Astra v. Sugar Products Com-
pany. In the latter case a contract for molasses was made in July, 1914.
One of the provisions in the contract was: "The regular arbitration
and force majeure clauses are to form part of this contract ..... .It
is agreed in the event of an arbitration being called, it is to sit in Lon-
don." The plaintiff, the buyer, brought action against the seller in July,
1916. The defendant answered with defences and counterclaims.
Between July, 1916, and April 19, 1920, there was active litigation.
The Court of Appeals held that, since the plaintiff had spent several
thousand dollars for fees and disbursements and that only upon the eve
of the trial (June, 1920) the defendant moved for a stay of proceedings
until the matters in difference were arbitrated, the statute should not be
applied to pending litigation, and that clear contrary intention could not
be found in the language of the statute. The decision in this case stands
by itself and, while important to the litigants, plays no important part
in the general development and status of the law in New York.
As was said at the outset, the decision in the Berkovitz case paves the
way for modernizing the American law on the subject of commercial
arbitration. At the meeting of the American Bar Association held 
in
St. Louis in 192o, resolutions were adopted calling upon the Committee
on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law to prepare a Federal law on
the subject.48  The first draft of such a bill was presented at the 
1921
session of the Association and the Committee is now re-drafting the bill.
Thus is the Bar of our country responding, at least in one field, to the
call that anachronisms in the law be abolished"
9 and the law be made to
conform to modern needs and conditions.
"Charles A. Boston, of New York. "I have a second motion. I ask that 
this
be referred without debate to the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commer-
cial Law of the American Bar Association. It is that that committee 
be requested
to consider the report at the next annual meeting of this Association upon the
further extension of the principle of commercial arbitration." 45 Reports of
American Bar Association (1920) 75.
" See paper by Dean Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, delivered before the
Conference of Bar Association Delegates at Saratoga Springs, N. Y.. September 3,
1917-(1920) 3 JOUR. AmER. JuDicATuRE Soc. 142.
